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Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to examine the alleged association between 
urbanisation and violence and to take some preliminary steps towards an 
exploration of the role of trust in improving urban governance and thus reduce 
violence. In this paper, violence is interpreted broadly to include both active or 
direct violence but also passive and social violence in terms of lack of voice, 
and as a symptom of governance failure. The paper includes a cross section 
analysis based on data for some 123 countries and an in-depth case study of 
India. I will also examine what may be termed as the Kerala-Bihar paradox. 
Kerala is well-known for its achievements in human development and 
according to India human development report of 2001, Kerala is ranked 1 on 
human development indicators while Bihar is among the states lagging behind 
in terms of human development. However, state level analysis of crime 
suggests that Kerala is more criminalised than Bihar.  In examining this 
paradox, some inferences are drawn on the role of trust in improving 
accountable governance and how this may result in reducing violent crime. 
Some issues for further research are identified.  
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1. Introduction 
Cities, by virtue of being engines of growth and concentrations of 
administrative machinery, tend to be focal points of governance failures and 
dysfunctional institutions as well. Examples can include the alleged links 
between corruption and urban mega-projects in Thailand in pre-1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis and between political patronage, real estate and unaccounted 
financial flows in Mumbai. Insecurity is one of the manifestations of 
accountability failure and dysfunctional institutions. While physical insecurity 
and violence in cities is a cause for concern, there is some evidence1 to 
suggest that the poor bear a disproportionately greater burden of both active 
violence (for example, during political unrests and protests) and passive 
violence (in terms of lack of voice, continuing neglect and lack of investment 
in social services such as water, sanitation, health care2). 
 
However, there are positive forces also located in cities, namely, by virtue of 
'agglomeration' benefits cities have opened spaces for the evolution of 
civil society organisations which have been playing an important role in 
improving governance. We can refer to this as „social‟ governance to 
distinguish from traditional concept of governance which tends to focus on 
accountability in (and mediated through) formal institutions of authority. Civil 
society institutions that emerged from collective action by interest groups have 
over a period of time developed and used economies of scope to include 
issues related to voice, rule of law, and accountability. Examples can include 
the Self Employed Women‟s Association in the western Indian states, Exnora 
in southern India3, and to some extent, Sarvodaya in Sri Lanka.  
 
An important but under-researched area in this context is that of trust4. 
Surveys such as Euro-barometer and Afro-barometer5 suggest that in many 
countries, the proportion of citizens who „trust the government‟ has been in 
decline even as countries put in place mechanisms to increase accountability. 
                                            
1 Wilkinson (2004) argues that violence is associated with inequality. A study commissioned 
by Asian Development Bank and focusing on Phnom Penh and Dhaka is premised on the 
view that the urban poor bear the brunt of violence. Also see Moser and Holland (1997) for a 
study of Jamaica where one of the arguments concerns the correlation between poverty and 
violence. 
2 The WHO (2002) report on violence and health identifies three  typologies of violence: self-
directed, inter-personal, and collective and four types of violent acts: physical, sexual, 
psychological, and involving deprivation or neglect.  
3
 See Bhatt (2005) for a discussion on SEWA; see Anand,1999; 2003 for a discussion on 
Exnora. 
4 Trust has been considered an important area of political science research for quite some 
time: some of the early studies focusing on trust include Easton, 1965, 1975; 
Fukuyama,1995; Hollis,1998. However, with the resurgence in new institutional economics, 
there is now some interest in measuring trust using indicators of trust to test conjectures. 
5 Though there is no equivalent Asia Barometer, some surveys have been published for East 
Asia. Approximately 36% of respondents in East Asian surveys said that they were either not 
at all satisfied or not satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (Wu and 
Chu,2007). 
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Some studies suggest an association between high-level corruption6 and lack 
of trust (Uslaner, 2005; 2007; Morris and Klesner,2008). While that is one 
explanation, it is also possible that accountability initiatives themselves 
contribute to increased expectations and measuring existing institutions using 
the new scales of increased expectations can lead to a sense of „democratic 
deficit‟.  
 
Against this background, an attempt is made in this paper to examine some 
issues related to violence and urban governance. This paper has three main 
aims: to examine the association between urbanisation and violence, using 
crime-rate as an indicator7; to examine whether voice and accountability 
contribute to a reduction in such violence; and to explore the potential role of 
trust in improving the quality of governance institutions that can deliver 
significant and real reduction in crime in urban societies. As part of this 
discussion, I will be examining a so called Kerala-Bihar paradox. I will be 
mainly using secondary sources of data: (i) international cross-country data 
sets from UNDP Human Development Report, the UN Office of Drugs and 
Crime, and the International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS); (ii) for the India 
case study, data from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India; (iii) 
for discussions on trust, some data from Asia Barometer and Indian data from 
CSDS polls. In section 2 an attempt is made to examine the association 
between urbanisation and violence using international cross-section data. A 
detailed case study of India including the Kerala-Bihar paradox is discussed in 
section 3. Some issues related to trust are discussed in section 4. 
Conclusions and some issues for research are presented in section 5.  
2. ‘Violence of urbanisation’ thesis and a critique 
What I would like to refer to as „violence of urbanisation‟ thesis has been put 
forward by numerous studies. The argument is broadly that urbanisation leads 
to greater degree of impersonal transactions and increased vulnerability which 
results in increased violence.  See for example, Gizewski and Homer-
Dixon,1995; to some extent in UN-HABITAT,2007. Prima facie, it appears that 
there is an association between violence, criminality and urbanisation. Data 
on total recorded crime8 is available from the UN Office of Drugs and Crime. 
Using this data for 61 countries, in figure 1, we do find a positive association 
                                            
6 Uslaner distinguishes between high-level corruption which concerns those with power and 
money (politicians, ministers, judges etc.) and low-level corruption (ordinary professionals 
such as teachers, journalists, doctors, and to some extent civil servants).  Uslaner and 
Badescu (2004) find that low-level corruption has no impact on generalised trust or trust in 
government.  
7
 There are significant limitations in using crime rate as an indicator of violence. Many forms 
of violence including violence within families and communities and „passive‟ violence are not 
captured in crime statistics. However, the arguments in this paper are premised on the view 
that crime rate represents a sub-set of violence within a society and that all things being the 
same, a more peaceful society will also have less crime.   
8 Crime and violence are not synonymous. There can be many crimes such as economic 
crimes without any physical violence. However, in the light of a broader description of 
violence including „social‟ or passive violence, I have used crime as an indicator of violence in 
this analysis. 
6 
 
between level of urbanisation and the rate of total recorded crime (number of 
crimes per 100,000 population).  
 
 
Figure 1: Urbanisation and total recorded crime rate (sample size 60 countries) 
However, such alleged association must be considered with much care. First, 
availability of data has narrowed down the sample to 60 countries. Since high 
income countries9 are over-represented in terms of data availability, this 
sample is biased [income effect]. Further, a second type of bias is that high 
income counties (which are also highly urbanised) have better quality  policing 
and criminal justice system and therefore, a greater percent of crimes in such 
countries are likely to be recorded [reporting effect]. Thirdly, while crime rate 
rather than incidence of crime (i.e., aggregate number of incidents of crime) is 
supposed to be a better indicator to take into account variation in crimes due 
to variation in population size, the resulting data is likely to be biased such 
that in populous nations such as China and India, crime rate appears to be 
very low [population effect].   
 
Homicide is an alternative indicator of violence and lack of personal security 
and a more relevant one in relation to governance since protecting the 
citizens is considered to be one of the main responsibilities of the state10. An 
assessment of the purported relationship between urbanisation and violence 
using homicide rate as an indicator of violence does not seem to support the   
„violence of urbanisation‟ thesis. Evidence is presented in figure 2 for 123 
countries. 
 
 
                                            
9 Data from UNODC and Victims of Crime Surveys (ICVS) suggest that crime rates are higher 
in high income regions such as North America and Europe. 
10 For instance, in the three roles of state Adam Smith discusses in the Wealth of Nations, two 
of the functions are securing the citizens from being attacked by other nations or those within 
the nation.  
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Figure 2: Urbanisation and homicide rate (sample size 123) 
Globally, homicide rates are 23 per 100,000 people in Africa; about 19 per 
100,000 in the Americas. Comparatively, homicide rates are lower in Asia at 
about 6 per 100,000 (UN Habitat, 2005:55).  
Governance and violence 
Governance concerns the development, functioning and accountability of 
institutions dealing with distributive justice. There are numerous indicators of 
quality of governance. For this analysis, I have used the governance 
indicators from World Governance Indicators dataset of Kaufman et al (2008). 
There is some evidence to suggest that there is an association between level 
of urbanisation and voice and accountability. Evidence in figure 3 suggests 
that there may be positive association between urbanisation and voice; 
evidence in figure 4 suggests that there may be a positive association 
between urbanisation and political stability.   
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Figure 3: Urbanisation and voice and accountability seem to be associated (sample size 123 
countries) 
 
 
Figure 4: Urbanisation and political stability seem to be associated  (sample size 123 countries) 
Association is not causality and in the case of both voice and political stability 
urbanisation can be both a cause as well as a consequence. 
 
As can be expected, there is negative association between voice and 
accountability and homicide rate (figure 5); likewise, there is a negative 
association between political stability and homicide rate (figure 6). In fact, the 
political stability indicator is described by Kaufman et al as „political stability 
and absence of violence and terrorism‟. 
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Figure 5: Voice and homicide rate (sample size 123 countries) 
 
 
Figure 6: Political stability and homicide rate (sample size 123 countries) 
The analysis presented so far seems to suggest that while total recorded 
crime may appear to increase with urbanisation, violent crime (such as 
homicide) seems to actually decrease with urbanisation. The positive 
associations between urbanisation and voice and accountability and political 
stability may provide a partial explanation. However, these preliminary results, 
crude and unsophisticated as they are, must be seen only as very preliminary 
indicators of potential relationships that need to be examined carefully.  For 
instance, the gender-neutral language used so far does not do justice to the 
fact that women and children are likely to be the major victims of urban 
violence. For example, the COHRE (2008) report notes that violence emerged 
as the strongest cross-cutting issue for women in slums across the world.  
 
y = -0.8179x + 6.5166
R² = 0.0062
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
H
o
m
ic
id
e
 r
at
e
 2
0
0
1
-0
4
 a
ve
ra
ge
Voice (WGI)  (Kaufman et al,2008)
Voice and homicide rate
homicide per 100,000
Linear (homicide per 
100,000)
y = -2.2426x + 6.573
R² = 0.0448
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
H
o
m
ic
id
e
 r
at
e
 p
e
r 
1
0
0
,0
0
0
 (
2
0
0
1
-2
0
0
4
)
Political stability (WGI) (Kaufman et al 2008)
Political stability and homicide rate
homicide per 100,000
Linear (homicide per 
100,000)
10 
 
3. A case study of India 
Crime data is available at state level in the Crime in India reports published 
annually by the Ministry of Home Affairs.  Crime can be recorded under the 
Indian Penal Code (IPC) or under special and local legislation (SLL). There 
has been a reduction in crime rate in India between 1996 and 2006: IPC crime 
rate has decreased from 183.4 to 167.7 in that decade; SLL crime rate has 
decreased from 492.2 to 287.9.  
 
There is considerable variation among states in India in terms of population 
size, per capita income and urbanisation11. A positive relationship between 
level of urbanisation expressed in terms of % of population in urban areas and 
crime rate (IPC) is noticed in figure 7 below. 
 
 
Figure 7: Urbanisation and crime- data for states in India 
However, as discussed in the international cross-section analysis in the 
previous section, there is a need to explore this „head line‟ relationship further. 
The Kerala- Bihar Paradox 
I was drawn to the topic of violence when I noticed a paradox while working 
on governance issues (Anand,2008). Kerala state in India is widely known for 
the progress that has been realised with regard to human development.  
Kerala ranked first among 15 Indian states in terms of human development 
among Indian states consecutively in years 1981, 1991 and 2001; Bihar 
ranked 15th in all these three periods (Planning Commission,2002:25).  
Kerala Human Development Report points out that the human development 
was achieved even while per capita income in Kerala lagged behind. The 
report argues that this implies a „higher rate of translation efficiency in terms 
of public action and giving higher priority and precedence to these services‟. 
                                            
11 Though India crime data for 2006 is used throughout this paper, Kerala-Bihar discussion is 
not affected by change of year. Data related to previous years also display the kind of 
patterns discussed here.   
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In 2000-01, the per capita net state domestic product12 for Kerala was Rs 
20,101 compared to Bihar‟s NSDP per capita of Rs 5,157 (the lowest among 
all states in India).  
 
However, here is the paradox. There is no significant difference in the 
incidence of total number of cognisable crimes13 (IPC) for 2006 in Kerala 
(105,255) and Bihar (100,665) (Government of India, 2007). However, Bihar‟s 
population is approximately 91 million compared to Kerala‟s 34 million. The 
incidence of crime thus translates into a rate of 110 crimes per 100,000 
population in Bihar and 332 crimes per 100,000 population in Kerala.  Based 
on crime rate, Kerala is ranked 3 (in terms of criminality) whereas Bihar is 
ranked 30. Notwithstanding the tremendous progress in human development, 
Kerala seems to have much greater degree of criminality than Bihar14. How 
can this be explained?   
 
Given that only 10% of Bihar‟s population lives in urban areas as compared to 
25% of Kerala‟s population in urban areas, an observer could argue that the 
difference between crime rate in Kerala and Bihar is merely a confirmation of 
the „violence of urbanisation‟ thesis. While higher level of urbanisation may be 
a factor, it cannot be the only explanation for this paradox. 
 
Recall the point made earlier in the previous section that three effects, 
namely, income effect, reporting effect, and population effect may have some 
influence on the observed positive association between urbanisation and 
crime rate.  
   
Data presented in figure 8 below suggests that income effect may have some 
role in explaining inter-state variation in crime rate in India too. Given that 
Kerala‟s income is much higher than Bihar‟s, we can argue that a reason 
behind high rate of crime in Kerala as compared to Bihar is due to this income 
differential i.e., an argument about income effect. This is similar to an 
argument about high crime rates in countries such as Sweden (13,516 in 
1997), Denmark (10,051) and Germany (8025) with India (179 using IPC or 
about 671 including both IPC and SLL).   
 
                                            
12
 States such as Goa, Delhi and the  UT of Chandigarh all had per capita NSDP of above Rs 
40,000. Per capita NSDP for Punjab, Haryana, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu states was also 
greater than that of Kerala.   
13 The analysis reported here focuses on state-wise crime rates based on crimes recorded 
under IPC.  Though not reported here, broadly similar results hold for an analysis of SLL 
crime figures also.  
14 A similar paradox is apparent in the case of corruption perception also. As per the 
Transparency International India studies, corruption in Bihar is described as „alarming‟ while 
corruption in Kerala is „high‟. Some of the other states with lower level of human development 
than Kerala, have lower levels of reported corruption. This is discussed in Anand,2008.  
12 
 
 
Figure 8: Per capita income and crime rate in Indian states 
A second reason for the divergence can be population effect. Since crime rate 
is calculated as a ratio of incidence of crime to total population, the rates for 
populous states are likely to be smaller than those of less populous states. In 
the international data (for year 1997), for example, China (131) and India 
(167) have crime rates which are considerably smaller than corresponding 
rates for less populous nations such as Belgium (8035) or New Zealand 
(12,591). Thus, it can be argued that the most populous Indian states, 
namely, Uttar Pradesh (population 185 million and crime rate 68.6 IPC 
crimes) and Bihar (population 91 million and crime rate 110) appear to have 
low crime rates compared to smaller states such as Goa (population 1.5 
million; crime rate 142) and Himachal Pradesh (population 6.4 million; crime 
rate 203). Population size, as shown in figure 9, has a negative effect on 
crime rate but the population effect does not fully explain the wide divergence 
between Bihar and Kerala.  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Population size and crime rate – relationship for Indian states 
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There could be three potential factors to explain this divergence which  
together constitute a „reporting effect‟. The first is with regard to composition 
of crime. While the incidence of crime (i.e., total number of cognisable crimes) 
in Kerala is slightly higher than that in Bihar, it is necessary to check whether 
there is a variation in the nature of crimes. Details presented in Appendix 1 
suggest that Kerala indeed has fewer number of serious crimes such as 
murder, culphable homicide,  dowry deaths, causing death by negligence, 
kidnapping and dacoity. There is much higher incidence of crimes such as 
hurt (bodily harm),  burglary and riots in Kerala than in Bihar.  
 
A brief digression may be necessary to discuss the issue of riots. Kerala has 
the highest rate of riots among all states in India. This can be partly explained 
by the fact that Kerala is the most heterogenous of Indian states in terms of  
religious composition of the population15. As per Census of India, in 2001, 
Bihar had a population of 83 million of which 83% were Hindus; 16.5% were 
Muslims; Christians formed less than 0.07%. For the same year, out of 
approximately 32 million population of Kerala, approximately 56% were 
Hindus;  25% were Muslims; and 19% were Christians (see Appendix 2). With 
the exception of Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur, no other state in India 
comes close to Kerala‟s heterogeneity. However, heterogeneity and so called 
„tolerant pluralism‟ has a long history in Kerala and therefore is unlikely to be a 
cause of violence. Such heterogeneity can at best be only a proximate cause 
of the high rate of riots in Kerala.  It is not being suggested that having a 
heterogenous mix alone leads to riots16. Heterogeneity can contribute to 
violence when other more important factors such as political, social, and 
economic insecurities persist and in the contests for control of the governance 
mechanisms such insecurities are manipulated through collective action by 
some groups or individuals who can overcome the cost of organising such 
collective action (Bardhan,2005). The Kerala Human Development Report 
notes that “…one of the major failures of human development achievements 
in Kerala has been the persistence of social group differences (horizontal 
inequalities) despite such a growth process” (Government of Kerala,2006:59). 
 
Returning to the question of the higher rate and incidence of crime in Kerala, 
the second factor could be more sincere recording of data by Kerala police. 
For example, 89% of all cognisable crimes under IPC are chargesheeted by 
Kerala police as opposed to 74.6% in the case of Bihar. The corresponding 
ratios for muders is 90% in Kerala and 79.3% in Bihar (Government of 
India,2007: table 4.4).  Likewise, conviction rate (namely the ratio of the 
number of convictions to the total number of cases tried) is 44% in Kerala 
compared to 16% in Bihar17.  Another indicator of „humane‟ policing in Kerala 
is from the incidence of police firing. One would expect that a high rate of riots 
                                            
15 Heterogeneity, particularly, religious heterogeneity does not automatically lead to violence. 
However, it can be an indirect and preliminary indicator of the potential for organised violence.  
16 For example, though Kerala lacks heavy industrialisation, its labour is more unionised than 
in many other states. 
17 Though conviction rate is better in Kerala than Bihar, many other states in India have far 
better conviction rates- for example, over 90% in Mizoram and Nagaland and over 80% in 
Manipur, and over 60% in Uttaranchal, Tamil Nadu and Chattisgarh. [Government of India, 
2007: table 4.10]. 
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in Kerala would correspond with a high-handedness of police in controlling 
mob, including through firing. In 2006, there were 1,363 instances of police 
firing for all states in India combined; 472 civilians and 62 policemen were 
killed. However, there were only two such incidents in Kerala and no one was 
killed. In Bihar, there were 14 incidents of police firing and 8 civilians and 6 
policemen were killed. (Government of India, 2007:table 14.1). 
 
The third contributing factor to „reporting effect‟ is that the more educated 
citizens of Kerala are likely to be more willing to report crimes to the police 
than in other states such as Bihar where the proportion of population who are 
literate is smaller. Literacy rate in Kerala is 90.9%  (and highest among Indian 
states) compared to Bihar‟s 47% (the lowest among all Indian states). An 
indicator of the literacy effect is how the principals (i.e., the citizens) hold 
police accountable, for example through complaints against the police. In 
Bihar, only 58 complaints were made against the police in 2006- and in almost 
all cases, a judicial inquiry was initiated. In contrast, in Kerala 1718 
complaints were made and in a great majority of these cases, a departmental 
inquiry was initiated- in only 1 case, a judicial inquiry was launched.    
 
While we do not yet have data on state-wide governance indicators similar to 
the international indicators compiled by Kaufman et al, from the above details 
we can conjecture that Kerala would have higher scores on voice and rule of 
law  indicators than Bihar.  
 
The extent to which state governments behave in a fiscally responsible 
manner can also be an indicator of the quality of governance. From the Twelth 
Finance Commission‟s report (Government of India,2005) we have some 
details. For the period 2005-2010, the total non-plan expenditure for Bihar 
was estimated to be Rs 1,272 billion; against this, the state‟s own tax and 
non-tax revenue (income) was projected to be Rs 220 billion (or income is 
approximately one fifth of planned expenditure). The corresponding figures for 
Kerala are: Rs 1,064 billion of non-plan expenditure and Rs 719 billion of tax 
and non-tax income (or income is approximately three fourths of planned 
expenditure).  State government spending (aggregate) on education and 
health is much higher in Kerala than in Bihar. Of the total non plan 
expenditure for the five years, compensation and assignment to local bodies 
is  less than 0.02 per cent in Bihar and 0.5 per cent in Kerala18. After the 73rd 
and 74th Constitution Amendments of 1992, there has been a statutory 
framework for local government in all states. However,  democratic 
decentralisation is considered to have been more effective in Kerala because 
of the mass participation of citizens through gram sabhas or village 
assemblies, which was utilised by the Communit Party (CPM) when it was 
elected in 1996, as a means to expand its reach beyond its traditional base. 
The so called People‟s Campaign for Decentralised Planning, or Campaign 
for short attempted to rally through mass mobilisation experts, volunteers and 
                                            
18 These figures from the National Finance Commission relate only to the funds devolved by 
the federal government. A significant share of local government finance comes from state 
finances. These are supposed to be allocated by State Finance Commissions.  
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local people to get involved in planning process.  Thomas Isaac (2000: 7) 
noted that:  
 
“…One of the major achievements of the Campaign has been the 
success in adapting the grama sabhas to suit the specific conditions of 
Kerala and to make them effective vehicles of citizen participation in 
the decision making process. In more than 100 panchayats the ideal of 
direct participation in governance is being realised through a network of 
neighborhood groups. Special emphasis has been given in the 
Campaign for the promotion of such community and beneficiary 
networks.”  
 
Heller (2000) points out that in the Campaign, a technocratic incremental 
approach was rejected and instead a „big bang‟ of financial devolution was 
used along with popular mobilisation banking on the previous successes of 
popular science movements in the state.  
 
Putting all the above arguments together we can draw some inferences about 
the Kerala-Bihar paradox in particular and „violence of urbanisation‟ thesis in 
general. Violence and crime are manifestations of governance failures. 
Observed association between urbanisation and violence needs to be 
examined carefully to uncover the underlying channels of interactions. Where 
the necessary institutions emerge, voice and accountability can be improved 
and this enhanced voice and accountability can monitor the policing 
institutions. In this „virtuous‟ interaction mode, institutions can work to improve 
personal safety such that crimes such as homicide decrease. A higher head-
line crime rate may persist but it may be partly a result of income effect and 
reporting effect. Where accountability institutions exist, citizens may be more 
forthcoming to report crime and therefore, reported crime rate may go up. In 
the „vicious‟ interaction mode, however, urbanisation can erode popular 
institutions and accountability mechanisms of policing. In such contexts, the 
higher head-line crime rate may be caused by a significant increase in serious 
and violent crime including homicides and police brutality.   The role of voice 
and „horizontal‟ accountability through participation and active network of civil 
society institutions may be crucial in determining whether the urbanisation 
process in a society moves towards the „virtuous‟ or „vicious‟ equilibrium19. 
4. Trust and governance 
As already mentioned in the introduction, one way to probe deeper into 
institutions and governance is to pursue the formation of trust. Where good 
quality communications exist between the principals and agents and credibility 
of contracts has been established through repeated interactions, the extent of 
trust can be expected to increase. While this is a rather simple narration of the 
process, in the studies by Uslaner (2001 and 2007) the above kind of trust is 
referred to as „strategic trust‟ as opposed to generalised or moralistic trust. 
Uslaner points out that strategic trust is not premised on a pessimistic view of 
the world but simply on the uncertainty. On the other hand, moralistic trust is 
                                            
19 Morris and Klesner (2008) also allude to the possibility of circular causation between lack of 
trust and corruption. 
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normative and predicated upon a positive world view about the behaviour of 
others. Generalised trust depends on moralistic trust but that they are not one 
and the same thing. In Uslaner‟s view, the continuum between generalised 
and particularised trust is somewhat similar to Putnam‟s concepts of „bonding‟ 
and „bridging‟ capital. However, Uslaner differs from Putnam in that for 
Uslaner: “…it is not the types of organisation that determines whether you will 
develop trust, but rather the type of trust you have that determines your level 
of civic engagement” (Uslaner,2001:7-8) 
 
There is evidence to the effect that trust and better quality governance co-
exist. Of course, there are problems of endogeneity and also circular 
causation- namely, trust may not be the cause but a result of good 
governance. However, trust can be used as an indicator of the quality of 
institutions (and the extent to which they encompass both formal rules and 
informal norms of behaviour, in the definition of institutions given by North). 
Ikeda and Kobayashi (2007) point out that evidence presented so far on the 
relationship between trust and participation is unconclusive. Based on 
analysis of data for seven East Asian countries, they find a weak support for 
the hypothesis that social trust is positively associated with political 
participation. They notice a somewhat paradoxical result that political 
participation is positively associated with having short cut to access resources 
in terms of knowing someone („having personal connection with powerful 
others‟). Their explanation is that citizens may be actively participating in 
political processes and vote to return the favour received from such powerful 
elites previously. 
Some preliminary results for India 
Though data similar to East Asia Barometer are not yet available for South 
Asia, some data available from opinion polls and surveys conducted by CSDS 
for CNNIBN.  
 
A question in these surveys asks respondent to express their trust in the chief 
minister and other political leaders on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 means a 
great deal of trust and 10 means no trust.  
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Table 1: Trust in state chief minister in 2006 and 2007 
Steps on 
ladder of trust 
Bihar  
January 2006 
Bihar  
January 2007 
Kerala 
January 2006 
Kerala 
January 2007 
 1 (great deal 
of trust) 
61.3 52.2 16.2 38.7 
2 15.1 17.2 11.9 10.5 
3 7.0 8.4 17.4 10.3 
4 4.1 6.7 12.2 32.4 
5 3.9 5.5 14.2 4.0 
6 1.0 3.8 13.2 2.5 
7 0.8 1.9 10.9 1.3 
8 0.8 2.7 2.5 0.2 
9 2.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 
10 (no trust) 3.1 1.3 1.5 0.2 
Source: CSDS (CNN IBN Poll) 2007 
We notice that in the case of Bihar there has been a slight reduction in the 
level of trust in chief minister while in Kerala there has been a significant 
increase, owing to State elections that were held in April-May 2006 when 
CPM and CPI led coalition won the elections and formed the government. 
This could be foreseen from the fact the „state leader 2‟ had higher level of 
trust than the then incumbent chief minister. 
 
While we do not have details on generalised level of trust, in another poll in 
July 2006, we have some comparative details on the four southern states. 
One of the questions asked respondents: „thinking of different dimensions of 
development which of these four states would you say is the best in terms of 
safety and security of life and property‟.  
 
Table 2: Opinion about safety and security of life and property 
 Andhra 
Pradesh 
Karnataka Kerala Tamil Nadu 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
54.9   8.8   4.8 19.0 
Karnataka 15.3 62.5 11.4 15.4 
Kerala 14.0 14.4 74.3 15.0 
Tamil Nadu 14.3 11.0   9.4 50.5 
No opinion   1.5   3.2    0.0   0.0 
Source: CSDS – CNNIBN Southern states survey, 2006. 
Results shown in table 2 indicate that almost three out of every four citizens in 
Kerala think that Kerala is the best state in terms of safety and security of life 
and property.  
 
Another question in the same poll asked respondents as to how safe they feel 
living in the city where they were. The responses are shown in table 3 below.  
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Table 3: Opinions about safety in selected states in India 
 Safe A little unsafe Unsafe No opinion 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
65.1 30.6   3.4 0.9 
Karnataka 67.0 26.2 4.1 2.6 
Kerala 50.6 31.7 15.7 2.0 
Tamil Nadu 42.5 48.9 5.0 3.6 
Maharashtra 68.6 25.3 5.2 1.0 
Delhi 21.1 63.2 13.7 2.1 
West Bengal 82.5 14.0 3.5 0.0 
Source: CSDS- CNNIBN Southern states survey 2006 
The responses seem to be somewhat puzzling because within the same 
survey, respondents seem to be expressing somewhat different views about 
safety in Kerala. Though a majority of people in Kerala feel that the city they 
live in is safe, among the seven states considered here, Kerala had the 
highest proportion of people who thought that it was unsafe. Respondents 
were also asked whether compared to a few years ago whether they felt more 
safe or less safe. These responses are shown in table 4.   
 
Table 4: More or less safe now than a few years ago: opinions in selected states in India 
 More safe Less safe Same as 
before 
No opinion 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
33.4 21.1   42.1 3.4 
Karnataka 34.6 41.2 21.0 3.2 
Kerala 24.5 43.2 27.9 4.4 
Tamil Nadu 32.7 48.7 16.0 2.6 
Maharashtra 32.0 38.1 26.3 3.6 
Delhi 7.4 55.8 33.7 3.2 
West Bengal 54.0 12.0 33.5 0.5 
Source: CSDS- CNNIBN Southern states survey 2006 
In five of the seven states more people seem to feel that it was less safe in 
2006 than a few years before.   On the whole, these results seem to suggest 
that perceptions of safety and satisfaction with economic conditions may be 
interrelated. They also seem to be affected to some extent by the level of trust 
citizens have in political leadership – though this is a very preliminary 
conjecture.  
 
The Kerala experience seems to suggest that through policy steps can be 
taken to facilitate active participation in governance processes through 
people‟s movements. However, such mobilisation seems to have worked in 
Kerala because of the history and long tradition of such institutions (in the 
sense of Fukuyama,1995; and Putnam et al, 1993) and high level of 
generalised trust (in the sense of Uslaner, 2001) due to high levels of literacy, 
education, and capabilities on the one hand and exposure to various sources 
of ethical values (for example, religion but also an egalitarian ethic inherent in 
communist political philosophy).  Local governance in Kerala seems to 
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suggest that the existence and involvement of vibrant civil society has been 
crucial. This model of „co-governance‟ or social governance may lead to 
multiple layers of accountability and thus increase trust. It appears that fiscal 
decentralisation and financial autonomy of local government units were also 
important factors. Along with the Campaign, a significant volume of resources 
were devolved to local government units. Thus, urgency was created for 
popular participation in the planning process so that resources can be 
directed to programmes which are most needed. With regard to the question 
is there evidence to suggest that increased voice results in less violence, the 
cross-country international data seems to provide some support. Previous 
work by Varshney (2002) suggested that inter-ethnic civic engagement 
(bridging social capital) is crucial in explaining why some cities remain 
peaceful while others face frequent communal violence. Though I have not 
examined the issue of inter-ethnic violence, the issue of criminality in general 
suggests that voice and accountability mechanisms may indeed contribute to 
a reduction in violence. However, political decentralisation in itself may result 
in decentralisation of corruption and elite capture which can be much more 
difficult to monitor and control (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000). The work of 
MKSS in India suggests that right to information can be crucial in improving 
accountability in the functioning of local government institutions.  In an 
exploration based on Oxfam‟s work in selected countries in Asia, Africa, Latin 
America and Europe, we find that even where right to information does not 
exist, civil society institutions can use approaches such as participatory 
budgeting and other such mechanisms to improve communication processes 
between the local government and the citizens (Anand and Jenkins,2008).  
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5. Conclusions 
Why do many citizens feel that the city where they live is less safe now than it 
was a few years ago? This seems to be in line with the „violence of 
urbanisation‟ thesis. However, the discussion in this paper also highlights that 
relationships between violence and urban growth are complex and multi-
faceted. The exploration here suggests that institutions may play a crucial role 
in influencing whether urban societies move towards a virtuous or a vicious 
circle. In the virtuous circle, even though overall crime rate may appear to be 
high, the composition of crimes shifts to less serious offences and much of the 
increase in crime rate can be explained by income effect, population effect, 
and the reporting effect. However, in the absence of necessary oversight 
institutions that encourage and facilitate participation, a top-down, and a 
predominantly legal and prescriptive approach to crime may not be effective. 
The roles of voice and political stability suggest that improving governance 
institutions may be crucial to improving personal safety and reducing violence 
associated with urbanisation. The discussion on Kerala-Bihar paradox helps 
to highlight many of these issues. This discussion also suggests that the role 
of civil society organisations seems to be an important one. A number of civil 
society or non-governmental organisations are functioning in Asia – whether 
they contribute to generalised trust which in turns leads to better interaction 
between citizens and the state institutions (Putnam thesis) or whether they 
thrive in contexts where governance institutions already facilitate the 
emergence of generalised trust (Uslaner thesis) is unclear.  
 
There is a need to examine further a number of issues. We need to identify 
the conditions that lead to development of social or generalised trust and how 
this influences or is influenced by trust in governance institutions. The East 
Asia studies (Ikeda and Kobayashi,2007) and the Mexico study (Morris and 
Klesner, 2008) both suggest that these two forms of trust are independet from 
each other, though there is scope for each influencing the other.  The Indian 
case study has given us an opportunity to make some tentative explorations 
to examine the divergence in the development of trust within a given cultural 
and value context.  This needs to be further examined through careful and in 
depth studies such as through instruments created for this purpose and 
through case studies. In this paper, we have used the number of complaints 
against the police  as an indicator of accountability of police; there is a need to 
explore further the governance of police institutions and the design of effective 
consultation and participation mechanisms in the governance of such 
institutions.     
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Appendix 1: Details of incidence and rate of crime (IPC) 2006 
 
 
       Bihar Bihar Kerala Kerala 
 
Incidenc
e 
Of crime 
Crime 
Rate 
Incidenc
e 
Of crime 
Crime 
Rate 
Murder 3,249 3.6 393 1.2 
Attempt to commit murder 3,303 3.6 347 1.0 
Culpable homicide not murder 326 0.4 87 0.3 
Rape 1,232 1.3 601 1.8 
Kidnapping and abduction-women and 
girls 1,084 1.2 202 0.6 
Kidnapping and abduction-others 1,535 1.7 92 0.3 
Dacoity 1,001 1.1 129 0.4 
Preparation for dacoity 140 0.2 125 0.4 
Robbery 2,169 2.4 3,531 3.9 
Burglary 3,531 3.9 4,245 12.6 
Auto theft 2,023 2.2 2,014 6.0 
Other theft 9,729 10.7 3,417 10.1 
Riots 8,259 9.0 6,365 18.9 
Criminal breach of trust 1,054 1.2 299 0.9 
Cheating 2,171 2.4 3,316 9.8 
Counterfeiting 97 0.1 68 0.2 
Arson 785 0.9 435 1.3 
Hurt 12,674 13.9 19,105 56.7 
Dowry deaths  1,188 1.3 25 0.1 
Molestation  530 0.6 2,543 7.6 
Sexual harassment  53 0.1 222 0.7 
Cruelty by husband and relatives  1,689 1.8 3,708 11.0 
Importation of girls  42 0 0 0 
Causing death by negligence  2,860 3.1 49 0.1 
Other IPC crimes 39,941 43.7 56,777 168.6 
Total cognisable crimes 100,665 110.2 105,255 312.5 
Source: Government of India, 2007. 
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Appendix 2: Share of population by religion- States of India 
 
 
Source: Created based on data from Census of India, 2001 
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